|
 Click
To Read Article about
Wind Power
A
HISTORY OF
TEXAS
TOWERS
IN
AIR DEFENSE
1952-1964
by
Thomas W. Ray
March
1965
Note:
This document was scanned into Microsoft
Word from a photocopy. Although the type
scanned in with minimal errors, the
photographs and drawings did not scan in
well enough to be of use. Click here for
a photo of a Texas Tower.
This
document was sent to me by Tom Page and
I thank him for his effort. Jeff
Barnes, Jan 1999.
Conception
and Approval,
1952-1953. Fastening radar platforms to
the ocean floor was first studied in the
summer of 1952. MIT’s Lincoln
Laboratory analyzed the feasibility of
stationing search and height-finding
radars on giant metal towers planted at
intervals along the ocean bottom,
similar to oil-drilling rigs employed in
the Gulf of Mexico. Lincoln Laboratory
concluded that a cluster of such Texas
Towers might, in fact, profitably serve
air defense purposes if erected about
100 miles off the northeastern coast of
the Atlantic seaboard. There, elevation
of the ocean floor, owing to the
continental shelf, conveniently afforded
areas shallow enough, yet far enough at
sea, to be strategically important.
Being fixed installations, Texas Towers
could accommodate heavy duty, long-range
radars like those used on land, instead
of lighter, medium range sets like those
used aboard picket vessels.
That
the preponderant amount of America’s
high priority targets were situated
inside the U.S. northeastern industrial
complex—within easy striking distance
of the Atlantic coast—made the stakes
involved that much more serious. Advance
warning furnished by Texas Towers, in
combination with other elements of the
growing early warning network, including
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)
aircraft together with Navy radar picket
ships, promised to reduce America’s
vulnerability to surprise attack.
Simultaneously, target tracking
information supplied by Texas Towers
would enable ADC’s control centers to
vector fighter aircraft to intercept
unknown targets far out at sea, where
hostile bombers could be destroyed long
before reaching bomb release lines. In
conjunction with AEW&C aircraft and
Navy picket ships, Texas Towers would
contribute to extending contiguous
east-coast radar coverage some 300 to
500 miles seaward. In terms of the air
threat of the 1950’s, this meant a
gain of at least 30 extra minutes
warning time of an oncoming bomber
attack.1
ADC
found no complaint with Lincoln
Laboratory’s recommendation that five
Texas Towers be installed. Lincoln
obligingly named the five sites best
suited for positioning radars: (1)
Nantucket Shoal (Lat. 40°45’N.,
69°19’W.,
80foot depth) 100 miles southeast of
Rhode Island; (2) Georges Shoal (Lat. 41°44’N.
, Long. 67°47’W.
, 56-foot depth) , 110 miles east of
Cape Cod; (3) Cashes Ledge (Lat. 42°53’N.,
Long. 68°57’W.,
36-foot depth), 100 miles east of New
Hampshire; (4) Brown’s Bank (Lat. 42°47’N.,
Long. 65°37’W.,
84foot depth), 75 miles south of Nova
Scotia; (5) Unnamed Shoal (Lat. 39°48’N.,
Long. 72°40’W.,
185-foot depth), 84 miles southeast of
New York City.
In
September 1952, ADC voiced its desire
that USAF favorably consider the
proposed Texas Tower layout for future
implementation. USAF first looked into
the legality of positioning fixed radar
platforms on the high seas, whereupon
the Judge Advocate ruled that no
violation of international law would
result from their placement adjacent to
territorial waters. Upon deliberating on
the other aspects concerned, USAF, too,
became convinced of their necessity and,
in the autumn of 1953. authorized
construction of all five. Accordingly,
funds were budgeted for them
during Fiscal Years.1954
and 1955; the Navy’s Bureau of
Yards and Docks was vested with
authority to conduct ocean surveys,
execute design engineering, draw up
specifications, and perform the other
services requisite to letting out
contract work to the lowest competent
bidder.2
Groundwork
for Implementation, 1953-1955.
All manner of things had to be
determined before precise specifications
detailing internal and external
dimensions—could be drawn up for
release to competitive bidders. There
was the matter of deciding how many and
what types of personnel to people the
towers with. Types of equipment to
install had to be settled beforehand:
not only surveillance and communications
kinds for operational purposes, but also
food preparation and recreational kinds,
among others, for logistic and morale
purposes. How to replenish, with some
regularity, expendable commodities and
other supply items, required thoughtful
consideration, so as to strike a proper
balance between overloading and
under-supplying each tower. These and
other questions raised by the concept of
sticking Texas Towers radars 100 or so
miles from shore constituted problems of
no mean proportion, which ADC, in the
early 1950’s, speedily came to grips
with.
Manpower
totals for sustaining three-shift,
round-the-clock operations was no easy
figure to compute. Initially, ADC had in
mind remoting tower radar data, via
submarine cable, from tower to shore,
where the weapons control function of
vectoring interceptors would be handled
by the crew at the parent ACW shore
site. This, accordingly, lessened the
number of persons whose presence would
be needed for tower duty. First, in
September 1952, a crew of 22 men was
postulated as a likely number for
maintaining continuous operations,
presupposing that Texas Towers would
have no target identification or weapons
control responsibilities. This estimate
climbed to 25 in August 1953, to provide
technicians for servicing the second of
two height-finders programmed. A few
months later, in November 1953, the
personnel contingent was re-estimated at
27, upped next to 41 in July 1954. It
then developed that no submarine cable
would be strung for remoting, that
existing “slowed down” video could
not be made to work properly in its
stead, and that too much time would be
consumed either fabricating or adapting
old equipment to this purpose. ADC
therefore was obliged to change heart,
electing to program control functions at
each tower, together with the attendant
increase in personnel this entailed.
Until near the end of the decade, when
the Texas Towers were scheduled convert
to SAGE operations (whereby the Lincoln
Fine System, AN/FST-2, would be
installed to feed lance data
automatically from the tower to
specified SAGE centers), the Texas
Towers were to operate manually,
utilizing GPA-37
consoles for vectoring
interceptors to their respective
targets. Consequently, personnel
estimates were upped again in January
1955, this time to 46 in all, to each
tower with personnel enough to handle
the control function, along with the
other conventional surveillance duties.
Space enough was allowed during the
stages (late 1954-1955) to accommodate
upwards of 72 which was fortunate
considering that the size of the
personnel force continued growing. In
mid-1956, after first tower was erected,
the staffing structure was hiked from 46
to 49 officers and airmen for sustaining
Texas Tower missions. Even this later
proved inadequate by five spaces, as
evidenced by a staffing pattern in 1957
calling for a total of 54, composed of
six officers and 48 airmen. This large a
contingent embraced personnel not only
to operate and maintain the
surveillance, control, and
communications equipment, together with
specialists in the plumbing, heating,
refrigeration, medical and cooking
business to help keep body and soul
alive, but also to fill unique spaces,
insofar as ADC was concerned, peculiar
to the Texas Tower mission. Into this
latter class was categorized the slot
for one S/Sgt (Staff Sergeant)
“seaman” and one A/lC (Airman First
Class) “marine engineman” to handle
maritime matters associated with Texas
Tower operations. So specialized were
some of these maritime support jobs,
that ADC, until subsequently discouraged
by USAF, showed interest in a 1956
proposal to transfer the entire Texas
Tower program—operations, maintenance
and all—to the Navy Department.
Besides
the commander, who was ordinarily a
captain, something like three to four
officer weapons controllers (AFSC 1644),
together with half a dozen or so airmen
ACW operators working under them, and
nearly an equal number of radar
repairmen under charge of an electronics
officer (AFSC 3044), were assigned each
crew. Communications operators and
technician repairmen were well
represented, too. Each crew was divided
into three shifts.
One
thing ADC insisted on regarding
personnel manning was the right to form
two crews per tower. ADC desired to
alternate on-station tower duty so that
no single crew spent more than one month
aboard a Texas Tower without time, the
following month, spent ashore, when the
second of two crews took its month’s
turn, on a rotational basis. Tower duty,
incidentally, counted as time aggregated
on an isolated overseas tour.
But
USAF was reluctant to authorize the
extra spaces that this two-crew plan
entailed. The most USAF would bend, was
a 1.5 crew manning ratio per tower. ADC
persevered in reaffirming need for a 2.0
crew manning ratio, and eventually
resorted to improvising the difference
by borrowing from its own resources.3
Determining
what kind of equipment to install was
more easily determined, particularly
with regard to surveillance equipment.
Precedents for selecting search and
height-finding radars already existed in
the form of ADC’s ground-based
AC&W sites. Drawing from its
experience with them, ADC picked the
FPS-3A long-range search set (modified
subsequently to the FPS-20A
configuration), and two FPS-6 long-range
height-finders. For protection from
wind, rain and snow, all three antennas
were to be enclosed in arctic tower
radomes composed of a rubberized dome
sprouting bulbously 55 feet in diameter,
and supported underneath by a walled
framework. These helped characterize the
shape TexasTowers finally assumed,
silhouetting a clover-leaf profile on
stilts.
Ordinarily,
installation of a pair of FPS-6 height
finders and an FPS-3A search set
entailed separating them at least 150
feet apart, for good reasons. If bunched
closely together, there was a real
danger of mutual electronic interference
being generated when radar antennas
faced one another. An exception to this
rule, however, had to be made aboard
Texas Towers, where surface space, of
necessity, was constricted. To
minimize chances of mutual interference,
yet compactly squeeze all equipment atop
a relatively small surface, the FPS-3A
search set, sandwiched between the other
two, was elevated so as to tower above
them. The two FPS-6 antennas, moreover,
were pointed in opposite directions, one
facing toward land, the other toward
sea, being slaved together, and to the
FPS-3A, for synchronizing movements. As
a final measure of precaution,
interference blankers were installed to
blot out electronic signals emanating
from FPS-6 antennas when pointing toward
the FPS-3A.4
Tower-to-shore
communications presented a problem
different from that of radars. There
simply was no network of telephone lines
conveniently at hand to tap into, as at
ACW stations on land. Notwithstanding
this, the question was settled long in
advance of tower erection time. ADC
originally wanted-to string submarine
cables from tower to shore at a cost
estimated at first to be $1,000,000 per
tower. Follow-on estimates that nearly
doubled this amount, however, helped
doom the submarine cable plan. Another
system equally favored by ADC was
adopted for primary point-to-point
communications: multiple-channel
tropospheric scatter radio, described in
more detail below.5
After
the size of the forthcoming personnel
contingent and of the equipment
inventory was, for the most part, known,
work proceeded on the platform to
accommodate them. Beforehand, the Navy
Bureau of Yards and Docks had contracted
core-drilling work in July 1954 to the
De Long Corporation and the Raymond
Concrete Pile Company. Feasibility
studies, on 18 June 1954, were farmed
out to the architect-engineering firms
of Moran, Proctor, Mueser and Rutledge
of New York City, and the
Anderson-Nichols and Company of Boston.
These studies were soon completed and,
by October 1954, their results
submitted. Hereupon, the Bureau of Yards
and Docks contracted with the same firms
to formulate the engineering and design
work for five towers. They were
expressly designed to withstand 125-mile
per hour winds and 35-foot high waves.
Texas
Tower 2.
Responsibility for constructing the
first Texas Tower was entrusted to
Bethlehem Steel Company. By then, each
of the five approved sites had been
designated as follows: Cashes Ledge was
named TT-1 (for Texas Tower 1); Georges
Shoal, TT-2; Nantucket Shoal, TT-3;
Unnamed Shoal, TT-4; and Brown’s Bank,
TT-5. This numbering sequence, however,
was not indicative of site-erection
priorities. Indeed, it was TT-2, Georges
Shoal that ADC chose for its first Texas
Tower. Situated some 110 miles east of
Cape Cod, the TT-2 unit, besides
enjoying a location in shallow waters
that would help facilitate its erection,
was to be among the first of ADC’s
radar units to tie into the emerging
SAGE network.6
By
the spring of 1955 Bethlehem Steel had
completed the first platform at its
Quincy, Massachusetts facility. The
steel platform was shaped into an
equilateral triangle with cropped ends,
measuring 210 feet along all three
sides, providing about half an acre of
surface area. So that it would
conveniently house programmed personnel
and equipment, combined with stores,
reserves, and spare parts essential for
long-term stays, the platform was welded
into a self contained, compartmentalized
unit 20-feet high, subdivided into
separate decks. The bottom-most deck was
employed mainly for maintenance and
storage space, where tanks and pumps
were located. The next deck was
partitioned into living quarters, a
galley and mess hall, administrative
offices, heating and air conditioning
areas, recreational areas, food storage
space, a dispensary and library. Atop
this, across approximately half the
wedge-shaped platform, was the
helicopter landing area. Occupying the
rest of the triangle was the uppermost
operations deck, some 210 feet long by
60 feet wide, rising 12 feet above the
rest of the 20-foot high platform.
Inside this deck was the surveillance
and control operations area, on top of
which would be perched the three radar
antennas enveloped by pressurized arctic
towers. Equipped with radars and other
gear, the platform, weighed 6,500 tons
or so.7
Transporting
the first platform from shore to site
was a toilsome task. There was trouble
enough launching it into water, let
alone hauling it to sea. Yet, by June
1955, it was successfully floated and
fitted for its sea voyage.
Responsibility for towing it to site and
then erecting it, was vested in the
Raymond and De Long Companies, who
embarked with their charge on 12
July 1955. Within two days
time, they arrived on site. Hereupon,
temporary legs were dropped to the shoal
(about 55 feet under water); the tower
platform was jacked up to rest on the
temporary legs high above the water,
while the three permanent legs, or
caissons were readied. Each of the three
tubular legs was designed for lasting
support, measuring over 160 feet long,
the first 48 or so feet of which were
ensconced snugly into the shoal, the
middle 55 feet of which remained
immersed in water, and the top 60 or so
feet of which rose above the water’s
surface, lifting the platform high and
out of harm’s way. The legs were
versatile enough to be logistically, as
well as architecturally purposeful. For
inside each steel leg was incased a
140-foot long steel tube six feet in
diameter where thousands of gallons of
fluid reserves, mostly water and fuel
oil, might be stored, surrounded by a
jacket of concrete over two feet thick.
One of the three hollow legs contained
seawater tapped for conversion to
drinking water. To this end,
distillation equipment was included for
producing several gallons of fresh water
per minute.8
By
the end of 1955, TT-2
was assembled, with bolts
tightened and the rest shipshape enough
for USAF to assume beneficial occupancy.
This it did, effective 2 December 1955.
The FPS-3A and twin FPS-6 height radars,
as programmed, were brought aboard and
installed. They detected targets of B-47
size, flying about 50,000 feet, up to
200 nautical miles away. But the same
targets flying at low altitudes say 500
feet—because of line-of-sight radar
characteristics, were discernible by
radar only up to 50 nautical miles away.
It was for this reason, among others,
that airborne early warning and control
(AEW&C) aircraft later patrolled
certain off-shore stations to cover
low-altitude radar gaps over looked by
Texas Towers, picket vessels, and
shore-based radars.9
Along
with the radars arrived the
communications equipment, without which
Texas Towers, being unable to transmit
their findings to shore, would be
incapacitated. Foremost among this
equipment came the point-to-point,
FRC-56 tropospheric scatter system.
Three parabolic-disk antennas, measuring
28 feet in diameter, were mounted
vertically, side by side, along the
platform edge supporting the operations
deck. Two at a time were utilized for
transmitting messages, while all three
combined received them. The signals were
deflected from the tropospheric layer of
Earth’s atmosphere, between the 30,000
and 60,000-foot level. A wide spectrum
of ultra-high frequencies was thus
exploitable without recourse to
expensive intermediate relay stations.
Normally unaffected by atmospheric
disturbances, the tropospheric scatter
radio system worked well in the manual
system for distances up to about 200
miles, and was intended to serve equally
as well for automated SAGE
communications later to come. At either
end of the system, telephone circuits
were patched in so that voice
communications could be reliably
maintained.
Apart
from this primary point-to-point system,
there was installed conventional BF
radio equipment for tower-to-shore
backup communications, and UHF and VHF
radio equipment for tower-to-air
communications. Teletype, cryptographic,
telephonic intercommunications and
public-address systems were incorporated
as well,
together with certain
aircraft radio navigational devices.
GPA-37
equipment was integrated to
facilitate weapons control operations.
To power the communications, navigation
and radar equipment thus brought aboard,
eleven 250 KW diesel generators were
rigged so that less than half of them,
operating in unison, would supply
sufficient electricity during any given
time. Air conditioning units were
furnished to prevent certain of the
equipment from over-heating.10
Site
P-10 (762 ACW Squadron) at North Truro
AFS, Massachusetts, was designated the
parent station for TT-2. Operational
concepts governing their relationships
were diligently spelled out in a
full-dress operations plan, first
published by ADC in July 1954, later
revised in July 1956. Other matters were
carefully worked out, such as methods
for transportation and supply. Two H-21B
helicopters per tower were authorized by
USAF, four of which were based at Otis
AFB and two, at Suffolk County AFB. The
twin-rotor H-21B had a theoretical
capacity for carrying 10 passengers or
2,000 pounds of freight. When equipped
with necessary flotation and survival
gear, however, the H-21B’s capacity
was cut to eight persons or 1,550 pounds
of freight. Other cargo, particularly
POL, was furnished periodically by ship.
Fuel, food and lubricants,were stocked
to provide at least a 30-day reserve;
spare parts were on hand for operational
equipment to last 45 days On 7 May 1956,
TT-2 achieved the status of a limited
operationally ready aircraft control and
warning station. For purposes of
furnishing logistical support for TT-2,
and for the others when the need arose,
the 4604 AC&W Squadron (Texas
Towers) was activated 8 October, 1956 at
Otis AFB, Massachusetts, which two
months later (December 1956), was
re-designated the 4604th
Support Squadron (Texas Towers).11
Texas
Towers 3 and 4.
Meanwhile, by November 1955, bids for
the next two towers had been accepted.
Construction contracts for both of them
were awarded J.
Rich Steers, Inc. of New York
City in collaboration with
Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., of Boise, Idaho.
Except for minor changes (including
longer legs and increased storage
capacity for diesel oil), these two
practically duplicated the configuration
and basic arrangement of TT-2.
Because
of future commitments to integrate Texas
Towers into upcoming SAGE centers during
the late 1950’s, ADC picked TT-3 at
Nantucket Shoal, and TT-4 at Unnamed
Shoal, for its next two towers. This
left only TT-1 (Cashes Ledge) and TT-5
(Brown’s Bank) unaccounted for. USAF,
for purposes of economizing, was anxious
to rid the program of them both.
At
first, ADC resisted all attempts in this
direction. Then, in late 1956, because
of the promise of increased off-shore
radar coverage by coastal AC&W
squadrons in the vicinity, where TT-1
and TT-5 were scheduled to go, ADC
agreed to drop TT-1 and TT-5 from all
further consideration, leaving three
towers, TT-2,TT-3 and TT-4, in the
program.12
In
1956 and 1957, work
proceeded on TT-3 and 4.
Platform and legs of TT-3 were readied
by mid-1956, launched the
night of 7
August 1956, and towed to
Nantucket Shoal and erected that same
month. On 29 November 1956, ADC assumed
beneficial occupancy. Next month the
superstructure and main supports of TT-4
were under construction at South
Portland, Maine. These were completed by
mid-1957,
then, starting 28 June 1957,
were towed to sea and placed at Unnamed
Shoal. ADC gained beneficial occupancy
in November 1957.
The
New Life.
During these same years (1956-1957),
personnel serving at TT‑2 — then
functioning manually on a limited
operational status—were learning of
peculiarities uniquely associated with
Texas Tower duty. For one thing, the
metal superstructure seemed to vibrate
constantly. As the FPS-20A long-range
radar antenna (converted from the
original FPS-3A model), continued
unceasingly to spin (except when out of
commission for maintenance), the diesel
generators, to grind out their power,
and the other equipment, to crank away
at their appointed tasks, TT-2 rattled
vibrantly from the ordeal. Standing like
a three-pronged tuning fork, the tower
resonated with noises that spread
farther, and amplified greater, than
initially occasioned by their source.
Matters were not improved when, every
half-minute or so during the frequent
fogs, the dismal-sounding foghorn
croaked out its forlorn message.
Still
worse, since it affected operations, was
the phenomenon of temperature inversion
suffered mostly in summertime. This
caused loss of radar coverage, creating,
in certain instances, permanent echoes
that obscured or distorted radarscope
reception. On occasion, equipment
components generated electromagnetic
disturbances that interfered with, or
disrupted, operations of other
electronics apparatus. Notwithstanding
these and other shortcomings, tower
crews became inured to those problems
not susceptible of change. And TT-2,
effective 17 April 1958, became fully
operational manually, then in September
1958, operational as a SAGE unit. TT-3
followed suit in October 1958. TT-4, in
mid-April 1959, was declared manually
operational, and in April 1960, SAGE
operational. Cost of the towers,
including platform, legs, radars and
communications equipment was reckoned at
around $13 million each, and with
operating expenses figuring about $1.5
million annually thereafter. TT-3
reported to, and comprised an annex of
the 773rd AC&-W Squadron
(Montauk, New York); TT-4, the 646th
AC&W Squadron (Highlands, New
Jersey).13
Communications
Difficulties. While
the three towers, by 1959, were thus up
and operating, all was not well with
them. One of the main difficulties
centered on the FRC-56 tropospheric
scatter communications system. When
functioning in the manual system,
employing voice communications,
tropospheric radio proved sufficiently
effective. But faulty communications
ensued after FST-2 equipment was
installed to automate communications for
SAGE operations, wherein tower-to-shore
communications were transmitted and
received, not by voice, but by
pre-coded, digitally computed electronic
signals for automatic assimilation by
SAGE computers. Since SAGE shore
computers were calibrated to reject all
except perfectly accurate inputs, the
tropospheric system, as then in
operation, simply could not accomplish
the task. It was decided about this same
time not to replace each FPS-20A search
set and twin FPS-6 height finders with
Frequency Diversity FPS-27 search and
FPS-26 height finder sets, as programmed
theretofore, because of the expense
involved. The FPS-20A’s at TT-2 and
TT-3, instead, were later modified with
GPA-103 equipment in late 1960,
incorporating certain ECCM devices that
reshaped their FPS-20A to the FPS67
configuration.
Several
remedies, meanwhile, were suggested to
correct the problem with communications.
One proposal reverted to ADC’s
original plan: stretching a submarine
cable from shore to each tower. Another
solution proposed by the MITRE
Corporation looked more toward refining
the existing apparatus, so that
tropospheric radio, with the addition of
Code Translation Data Service (CTDS),
would still bear the burden
of primary tower-to-shore transmission
and reception. CTDS would tolerate
greater signal level variations than
existing subsystems. American Telephone
and Telegraph Company (AT&T), which
frowned on this idea, was approached
with a proposal to take charge, on a
contract basis, of maintenance and
operation responsibilities for the
tropospheric system. While solutions to
this problem were under consideration,
the three Texas Towers reverted to
operating as a manual adjunct, employing
voice communications, in the far-flung
semi-automated SAGE network.14
In
1960, a proposal was advanced that
perhaps would have solved some part of
the communications problem, namely the
installation aboard Texas Towers of ALRI
(Airborne Long Range Inputs) equipment
designed to automate the communications
process. This plan was soon discarded,
for several reasons, not least of which
was the dearth of available space for
accommodating the ALRI equipment. The
same year, all further consideration was
dropped of stringing submarine cables,
or adding CTDS, leaving only the
prospect of AT&T taking charge of
maintenance and operations. Antenna
realignments combined
with improved maintenance,
supply, training and operating
procedures enhanced tropospheric
communications appreciably during 1960,
and to all intents and purposes rendered
them satisfactory for SAGE as well as
for manual operations.15
Tragedy
of TT-4.
A problem of inherent stability at Texas
Tower 4 loomed so large at this time
that it overshadowed all previous Texas
Tower problems. Ever since TT-4 was
towed to site in mid-1957, it had become
an engineering nightmare. To begin with,
supports for TT-4 had been made somewhat
differently from those fabricated for
TT-2 and TT-3, chiefly because of the
extra depth involved. Whereas TT-2 and
TT-3 stood firmly in relatively shallow
waters, 56 and 80 feet, respectively,
TT-4 stood in water two to three times
deeper, 185 feet to be exact. A series
of underwater bracing-s were made to
compensate for the extra stresses
incurred. But in the process of towing
TT-4 to site in June-July 1957, two
diagonal braces, vital to lacing the
three legs snugly together, were lost.
The contractor and the Bureau of Yards
and Docks decided to improvise repairs
on the spot, rather than return to shore
for reworking defective portions. The
original design strength,
consequently, was not restored.
From
the time it was erected, Texas Tower 4
wobbled some when under stress caused by
brisk winds and waves. Platform motion
became the rule rather than the
exception. The Navy, in late 1958,
conducted underwater surveys of TT-4’s
supports, resulting in the discovery
that certain collar connection bolts
either had sheared or worn loose. The
problem was aggravated because the
defective portion weakened not only its
immediate area, but also shifted
considerable stress onto non-defective
members. From late 1958 to May 1959,
with at least six interruptions due to
storms, the contractor effected repairs
that stabilized the platform for several
months. Four successive storms struck in
the winter of 1959-1960, which
threatened to undo tower stability all
over again.
In
early 1960, another underwater team was
sent down to take stock of things and
found certain pins and connections
irreparably damaged; whereupon a set of
above-water bracings were manufactured
and, by August 1960, applied. According
to the contractor, original design
strength was restored to TT-4 — it
could withstand winds up to 125 miles
per hour and breaking waves up to 35
feet high. Scarcely a month elapsed,
however, when Hurricane “Donna” (12
September 1960) whirled in at forces
exceeding design specifications: 132mile
per hour winds and breaking waves
exceeding 50-foot heights. TT-4,
evacuated of all personnel two days
before, survived “Donna,” but not
without first shaking and rocking a
great deal from the impact. Part of
TT-4’s superstructure was destroyed;
worst of all, below-water bracings were
fractured, cutting overall strength to
55 per cent of what it had been built up
to prior to “Donna.” Further
examination of above and below-water
components resulted in a decision to
undertake extensive repairs in the
spring of 1961. 1 February 1961 was
established as the date for complete
evacuation of TT-4. Meantime, a
maintenance crew of 28 persons -- 14
USAF and 14 contractor repair
personnel—were stationed aboard to
perform certain repair work. Then on 14
and 15 January 1961, TT-4 was again
caught in a storm that battered the
tower with winds up to 85 miles per hour
and waves up to 35 feet high thrashed
its legs. Finally, TT-4 could stand no
more. At about 1920 hours the night of
15 January, one of its three legs
snapped in half; the remaining two
thereupon broke, and the platform, with
all hands aboard, sank to the ocean’s
bottom.16
Demise
of TT-2 and TT-3, 1961-1964.
The tragedy of TT-4, as much as anything
else, sealed the fate of TT-2 and TT-3.
While both remaining towers were
immediately checked for safety and
structural strength, and pronounced
sound in this regard, their days were
numbered. This was first hinted in March
1961, when Lieutenant General Robert M.
Lee, ADC commander wrote:17
At
this time there is no valid reason for
abandonment of Texas Towers No. 2 and 3.
However, in view of the inherent danger
and the current inability to evacuate
safely during storm conditions, this
headquarters, in conjunction with
Headquarters NORAD, will continue to
consider the operational requirement for
these towers. There is a possibility
that, after the ALRI (Automatic Long
Range Input) System becomes operational
in AEW&Con aircraft, sufficient
reliable coverage may be achieved so
that the contribution of Texas Towers 2
and 3 to the air defense system will be
reduced. In this event, shutdown of the
towers, with a resultant elimination of
the inherent risk, and saving in money
and manpower, may be possible. On the
basis of technical advice now available
there is no concern for the stability of
the towers, but should the result of the
engineering survey indicate the
existence of any deficiencies, immediate
action will be taken to discontinue
their operation.
Ultimately,
it was decided to do just that: phase
out TT-2 and TT-3 when ALRI equipment
became operational in the AEW aircraft
wing based at Otis AFB, Massachusetts.
ALRI, in essence, would automate much
more of the off-shore surveillance and
weapons control functions along the
Atlantic seaboard, and with ALRI-equipped
aircraft covering virtually the same
area as TT-2 and TT-3, the two towers
would become expendable commodities.
Until ALRI became operational. However,
the command sought to implement the best
of all possible escape methods aboard
the surviving towers, so that the TT-4
episode would not be repeated. Several
experimental methods were considered and
all but one were ruled out a —
watertight escape capsule. Just such a
survival capsule, capable of
accommodating seven persons, with food
and oxygen enough to last 15 days, was
designed by the Electric Boat Division
of General Dynamics. Two were made, one
for each tower, and they were installed
in October 1962. Meantime, tower
evacuation criteria were revised, so
that all would depart except a seven-man
emergency stand-by crew whenever 50-knot
winds or 35-foot waves were forecast. A
seven-man standby crew was necessitated
because of a complication occasioned by
Soviet trawlers, which often loitered
close by
the towers. Without a standby
crew to keep guard, Soviet sailors might
try to board a fully evacuated tower,
then claim possession on grounds of
salvage rights. If worse came to worse
as regards tower stability during a
storm, the seven-man standby crew could
scramble into the survival capsule for
protection. Even the seven-man crew
would evacuate when 70-knot winds, or
more, were in the offing. The Coast
Guard, in an on-again, off-again
commitment, promised to position a
vessel, if available, near completely
evacuated towers to prevent unauthorized
boarding by Soviet mariners.
All
this, while the Atlantic Ocean, as if
impatient to rid it of the troublesome
towers, attacked them from above and
below. A succession of storms struck
during 1962 and 1963 that forced
abandonment of the towers a number of
times. Between October 1961 and March
1962, for instance, the towers were
evacuated ten times, resulting in loss
of the equivalent of 120 operational
days. Still later that same year, TT-2
and TT-3 experienced many more
evacuations. Also, TT-3 lost at least
two inflatable radomes, one of which was
blown off the FPS-67 search set in the
summer of 1962, and the other of which
collapsed over a FPS-6 height-finder in
January 1963. Simultaneous with these
forces working above, strong ocean
currents worked steadily beneath to
undermine the foundation of the two
towers. Scouring of serious proportions
resulted, flushing away rock fill
supporting the three legs of each tower
down to a depth of 10 feet. Even
rock-fill replacement leveled around
them in November 1961 failed to stay the
action of these underwater forces. The
towers, consequently, became far more
susceptible to being uprooted by storms
of hurricane strength.18
At
last, in 1963, ALRI stations became
operational in the Atlantic AEW&C
aircraft fleet. The JCS, in January
1963, authorized the inactivation of the
towers. No longer having a need for TT-2
and TT-3, and still mindful of the
catastrophe at TT-4, ADC ordered the two
towers dismantled. TT-2 was first to go,
being decommissioned 15 January 1963,
then stripped of its communications and
electronics equipment. Its three legs
were dynamited; but the platform, rather
than float to shore, plunged to the
bottom, denying one salvage company the
fruits of its preparations. It was as if
the capricious Atlantic, vindictive to
the last, pulled down another victim to
its murky bottom.
TT-3
was decommissioned 25 March 1963, and
shortly relieved of its radars and
communications equipment. Special care
was taken in mid-1964 to save TT-3’s
platform, the bottom deck was pumped
full of urethane foam, then sealed, to
insure floatation. On 6 August 1964, the
three legs were blasted out from beneath
it, whereupon TT-3 platform plunged into
the ocean; cork-like, it then rose to
the surface, enabling salvage crews to
drag it shoreward. Once and for all, the
episode of Texas Towers in air defense
was brought to a close.19
FOOTNOTES:
1.
ADC Historical Study No.
10, Seaward Extension of
Radar 1946-1956, pp. 71-75;
ADC, Operational Plan for Texas
Towers, 20 Jul 1954 [HRF]; USAF
Historical Study No. 126, The
Development of Continental Air Defense
to 1 September 1954, p. 72
2.
Ltr, ADC to USAF,
“Extension of Radar Coverage in the
Northeast Coastal Area,” 24 Sep 1952
[Doc 91, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of,ADC,
Jan-Jun 1955]; USAF Plan, “Planning
Guide for Implement of Texas Towers,”
16 Nov 1953 [Doc 93, Doc Vol XIII, Hist
of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; Ltr, USAF to ADC,
“Air Defense Program Requirements,”
11 Jan 1954 [Doc 94, Doc Vol XIII, Hist
of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Ltr, USAF to
Bureau of Yards & Docks, ‘IFY 1955
Advance Planning Directive - Texas
Towers,” 8 Mar 1954 [Doc 95, Doc Vol
XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955); ADC
Historical Study No. 10, pp. 71-72; Hist
of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, P. 70; USAF
Historical Study No. 126, pp. 72-73.
3.
See Appendix A for Texas
Tower manning structure; Ltr, ARDC to
ADC, “Project Texas Towers,” 26 Sep
1952 [Doc 90, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun 1955]; Ltr, ADC to USAF,
“Texas Towers,” 24 Aug 1953 [Doc 92,
Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun
1955]; USAF, “Planning Guide for
Implementation of Texas Towers,” 16
Nov 1953 [Doc 93, Dov Vol XIII, Hist of
ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; IOCY M&O (ADC)
to C&E, et.al., “Change to
Detachment Manning to be for Texas
Towers,” -27 Jan 1955] IOC M&O,
Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun
1955]; ADC, “Operational Plan for
Texas Towers,” 1 Jul 1956 [HRF]; Ltr,
EADF to ADC, “Information for Guidance
of Officers and Airmen Selected for
Assignment to 762ACWRON w/Duth Station
at Georges Shoal Tower Annex (T-2),”
23 Nov 1956 [HRF]; ADC Historical Study
No. 10, pp. 80-82; Ltr, ADC to USAF,
“Request for Headquarters USAF
Guidance on Texas Tower operation and
Maintenance,” 26 S.ep 1956 [Doc 37 in
Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 19561; Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun 1955, pp. 34-38; Ltr and Ind,
ADC to ARDC, “Radar Video Remoting,”
12 Jan 1955 [Doc 97 in Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun 19551; Ltr and Incl, RADC to AF
Cambridge Research Center, “Use of
GPA-37 with Texas Towers, n.d., ca. Feb
1955 [Doc 99 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun
1955]ADC, Logistic Support Plan for
Texas Towers, 12 Mar 1956’[Doc 140 in
Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956];
Hi-s-t-o-T-ADC, Jul-Dec 1956, pp. 44-45;
Ltr and Incl, ADC to USAF, “Request
for Headquarters USAF Guidance on Texas
Tower Operation and Maintenance, 26 Sep
1956 [Doc 37 in Hist of ADC,, 9 Nov 1956
to Ltr and Incl, ADC to USAF, “Request
for Headquarters USAF Guidance on Texas
Tower Operation and Maintenance,” 26
Sep 1956 [Doc 38 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec
1956]; C&E Digest, Aug 1957, pp.
4-5.
4.
Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Texas
Towers,” 24 Aug 1953 [Doc 92, Doc Vol
XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955];
C&E Digest, Jul 1957 pp.
13-15.
5.
See Appendix B for Texas Tower
Equipment List;
Ltr,
ARDC to ADC, “Project Texas Towers,”
26 Sep 1952 [Doc 90,
Doc
Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551;
USAF, “Planning
Guide
for Implementation of Texas Towers,”
16 Nov 1953 [Doc
93,
Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun
1955]; Ltr, Rome Air
Def
Center to ADC, “Improvement and
Modifications to Production
AN/GPS-37,11
19 Oct 1954 [Doc 100, Doc Vol XIII, Hist
of ADC,
Jan-Jun
1955]; Ltr and Atch, MIT to ADC, 24 Feb
1955 [Doc 112, Doc Vol
XIII,
Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; ADC,
“Operational Texas Towers,” 20 Jul
1954 [HRF); ADC, Plan for Texas
Towers,” 1 Jul 1956 [HRF].
“Operational Plan for Texas Towers,”
1 Jul 1956
6.
ADC Historical Study No. 10, op.cit.
, p. 74; “Last of the Texas Towers, AU
Review, Vol XVI, No. 1 (Nov-Dec 1964),
pp. 92-94; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961,
pp. 70-73.
7.
ADC
Historical Study No. 10, op.cit., pp.
74-76: “Last of the Texas Towers” AU
Review, op.cit. , p. 93; C&E Digest,
Jul 1957, 13-15.
9
. EADF, “Operational Plan Texas
Tower No. 2,11 1 Sep1955, P. 2 [Doc 98,
Docs Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955
].
10.
C&E Digest, Jul 1957, pp.
13-15 and Aug 1957, pp. 1-6.
11.
ADC Historical Study No. 10, op.cit.,
pp. 76, 82-84; ADC, “Operational Plan
for Texas Towers, 20 Jul 1954 and 1 Jul
1956 [HRF]; Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun 1955, pp. 34-36; Hist of ADC,
Jul-Dec 1955, pp. 67-68; Hist of EADF,
Jan-Jun 1956.pp. 64-68; Hist of ADC,
Jul-Dec 1956, p. 64-68 45; ADC, Logistic
Support Plan for Texas Towers, 12
Mar 1956 [Doc 140 in Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun 1956.]
12.
ADC, IOC from ADMEL-3, “Trip
Report-Texas Towers, [Cont’d] 26 Sep
1955 [Doc 107, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of
ADC, JanJun 1955); Msg COOPR 30332,
CINCNORAD to USAF, 25 Oct 1956 [Doc 109,
Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun
19551; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956, pp.
42-43; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, P. 37;
Ltr, USAF to ADC
“Operational Plan for Texas
Tower,” 17 Jun 1955 [Doc 80 in Hist of
ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Msg AFOOP OP D
55901, USAF to ADC- 30 Jun 1955 [Doc 100
in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Msg ADOPR
3645, ADC to USAF, 2 Aug 1955 [Doc 103
in Hist of ADC,
Jan-Jun 1955]; IOC, ADAIE-CA
to ADAIE-C, “Construction’Schedule
Texas Tower 3 ...”
8 Aug 1956 [Doc 33 in Hist of
ADC, Jul-Dec 1956.]
13.
Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955, p. 39,
Jan-Jun 1956, pp. 37-38, Jul-Dec 1956,
pp.. 41-47; Hist of EADF, Jul-Dec 1956,
pp. 69-74, Jan-Jun 1958, pp. 49-50; Hist
of ADC, JanJun 1959, pp. 58-59, Jul-Dec
1959, p. 43; IOC, ADAIE-CA to ADAIE-C,
“Construction Schedule Texas Tower
3...,” 8 Aug 1956 [Doc 33 in Hist of
ADC, Jul-Dec 1956]; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun
1961, pp. 72-73; C&E Digest,
Aug 1957, pp. 1-6; IOC, ADOCO-C to DCS/0,
“Report of Staff Visit,” 27 Aug
1956, p. 2 [Doc 32 in Hist of ADC,
Jul-Dec 1956]; C&E Digest, Nov 1958,
pp. 4-6; C&E Digest, Apr
1959, p. 14; Ltr, ADC t5-USAF,
“Operational Survey of the 26 Air
Division (SAGE),” 5 May 1959 [Doc 70
in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959].
|
Home